Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
分析竞争加剧对管理激励的双重影响：提高清算概率促进努力，但降低利润削弱激励，总效应不确定。通过自然情形和例子说明竞争与努力的非单调关系。
The paper shows that an increase in competition has two effects on managerial incentives: It increases the probability of liquidation, which has a positive effect on managerial effort, but it also reduces the firm's profits, which may make it less attractive to induce high effort. Thus, the total effect is ambiguous. I identify natural circumstances where increasing competition unambiguously reduces managerial slack. In general, however, this relation need not be monotonic. A simple example demonstrates that—starting from a monopoly—managerial effort may increase as additional competitors enter the market, but will eventually decrease when competition becomes too intense.