Depositors' Welfare, Deposit Insurance, and Deregulation
构建分析模型研究最优存款保险政策，发现放松银行活动或存款利率上限会在存款人福利与保险系统稳健性之间产生权衡，且风险敏感保费和资本要求可能无法有效管理银行风险。
ABSTRACT We develop an analytical model to address the question of optimal deposit insurance policy and to examine the impact of deregulation on depositors' welfare and the soundness of the insurance system. We find that the optimal level of regulation depends critically on the functional relationship between risk and return. We show that in general deregulation of bank activities and/or of deposit rate ceilings will in volve tradeoff between depositors' welfare and the soundness of the insurance system. Our analysis also indicates that risk‐sensitive premium and capital requirement schedules may not be efficient in managing the risk of banks.