Macroeconomic Performance in the Bretton Woods Era and After
研究布雷顿森林体系时期OECD国家的高速增长及其后的放缓，通过博弈论模型解释制度如何影响投资和工资谈判，从而改变经济均衡。
During the Bretton Woods era, OECD countries grew at historically unprecedented rates. This Golden Age has many possible explanations, ranging from the return to liberal policies in international trade to a backlog of profitable growth opportunities after the neglect of the 1930s and wartime damage. Eichengreen (1996) has argued that the proximate cause of the rapid growth was high investment, and that this high investment was made possible by certain institutions that were particularly well suited to reconstruction and growth. On the domestic side, these institutions led to high investment rates and moderate wage claims. This paper interprets the interaction between unions and firms as a coordination game. The risk-dominant equilibrium is selected via a global game argument. Only small changes to the payoffs are necessary to explain a change in the selected equilibrium and, therefore, the growth slowdown.