Field experiments on the effects of reserve prices in auctions: more Magic on the Internet
通过互联网上《魔法风云会》卡牌市场的实地实验，研究最低出价（保留价）对竞拍人数、成交概率、出价水平和拍卖收入的影响，验证了对称独立私人价值模型的均衡预测。
I present experimental evidence on the effects of minimum bids in first‐price, sealed‐bid auctions. The auction experiments manipulated the minimum bids in a preexisting market on the Internet for collectible trading cards from the game Magic: the Gathering. I examine a number of outcomes, including the number of participating bidders, the probability of sale, the levels of individual bids, and the auctioneer's revenues. The benchmark theoretical model is one with symmetric, risk‐neutral bidders with independent private values. The results verify a number of the predictions concerning equilibrium bidding. Many bidders behave strategically, anticipating the effects of the reserve price on others' bids .