Auctions for Split‐Award Contracts
研究买方将同质投入品需求拆分为两份合同、通过顺序第二价格拍卖分别授予不同供应商时的定价效果，发现固定供应商时买方预期价格高于单一来源拍卖，内生进入时二次合同可能增加供应商数量并降低预期价格。
The buyer of a homogeneous input divides his input requirements into two contracts that are awarded to different suppliers. He uses a sequential second‐price auction to award a primary and a secondary contract. With a fixed number of suppliers the buyer pays a higher expected price than with a sole‐source auction. The premium paid to the winner of the secondary contract must also be paid to the winner of the primary contract as an opportunity cost. When entry is endogenous, we identify the conditions under which a secondary contract can increase the number of suppliers and lower the expected price.