A dual agency view of board compensation: the joint effects of outside director and CEO stock options on firm risk
研究了外部董事和CEO的股票期权薪酬如何共同影响企业风险承担，发现外部董事期权的影响强于CEO期权，且两者存在替代效应。
Abstract This paper contributes to multiple agency theory by examining how the compensation schemes awarded to outside directors and the CEO jointly affect firm‐level risk taking. Using data of the S&P 1500 firms from 1997 to 2006, we find support for earlier arguments that providing the CEO, the outside directors, or both with stock options increases risk taking. More importantly, we find that compensating outside directors with stock options has significantly stronger effects than CEO stock options. Finally, contrary to what one would expect, we find that these effects are mutually substituting; that is, if both the outside directors and the CEO are provided with stock option compensation, outside directors' incentives weaken the effect of the CEO's incentives on firms' risk taking. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.