Optimal Information Disclosure
研究发送方如何通过部分信息披露，将低相关但高利润的前景与高相关但低利润的前景混同，以最大化自身利润，并扩展到考虑接收方剩余和货币激励的情形。
A sender randomly draws a "prospect" characterized by its profitability to the sender and its relevance to a receiver. The receiver observes only a signal provided by the sender and accepts the prospect if his Bayesian inference about the prospect's relevance exceeds his opportunity cost. The sender's profits are typically maximized by partial information disclosure, whereby the receiver is induced to accept less relevant but more profitable prospects ("switches") by pooling them with more relevant but less profitable ones ("baits"). Extensions include maximizing a weighted sum of sender profits and receiver surplus and allowing the sender to use monetary incentives.