Shared Agents and Competition in Laboratory English Auctions
通过实验室模拟牲畜拍卖，研究共享代理（一个代理代表多个委托人）如何影响交易价格，发现代理知晓销售量时价格更低，且市场集中度提高会导致显著低于竞争均衡的反竞争定价。
At livestock auctions, the same purchasing agent can represent more than one processor. Repeated multiple‐unit English auctions are created in a laboratory to measure the impact of shared agents on trade prices under alternative treatments with six, and as few as two, agents representing six principals. Treatments are constructed in which the agents either know or do not know quantity for sale, and in which there are progressively fewer agents bidding. Knowledge of quantity for sale can be anticompetitive. Evolution toward increased market concentration leads to consistent anticompetitive pricing, resulting in prices significantly lower than the predicted competitive equilibrium prices.