Enforcement In Apprenticeship Contracts: Were Runaways a Serious Problem? Evidence from Montreal
利用蒙特利尔的档案证据，分析18世纪末学徒逃跑的动机与合同执行的作用，质疑了历史学家关于师傅无法制定可执行合同导致学徒制衰落的观点。
Historians argue that in late eighteenth-century North Aerica, apprentices often ran away form their masters. Masters’ inability to write enforceable contracts, the argument goes, sparked the decline of traditional apprenticeships. This article addresses the issue of enforcement. I analyze an apprentice’s incentive to run away and the role of enforcement with detailed archival evidence form Montreal. These data cast doubt on the claim that masters were unable to construct enforceable contracts and call into question the severity of a runaway problem.