Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500
研究发现标普500中三分之一的公司存在家族所有权，且家族企业比非家族企业表现更好；家族成员担任CEO时绩效更优，表明家族所有权是有效的组织结构。
Abstract We investigate the relation between founding‐family ownership and firm performance. We find that family ownership is both prevalent and substantial; families are present in one‐third of the S&P 500 and account for 18 percent of outstanding equity. Contrary to our conjecture, we find family firms perform better than nonfamily firms. Additional analysis reveals that the relation between family holdings and firm performance is nonlinear and that when family members serve as CEO, performance is better than with outside CEOs. Overall, our results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that minority shareholders are adversely affected by family ownership, suggesting that family ownership is an effective organizational structure.