Job Matching and the Wage Distribution
结合微观劳动与宏观均衡视角，将工作匹配模型嵌入均衡搜索框架，推导出工资分布的均衡形状（单峰、右偏、帕累托尾部），并发现高生产率风险会抑制学习与分类、降低工资不平等。
This paper brings together the microeconomic-labor and the macroeconomic-equilibrium views of matching in labor markets. We nest a job matching model à la Jovanovic (1984) into a Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)-type equilibrium search environment. The resulting framework preserves the implications of job matching theory for worker turnover and wage dynamics, and it also allows for aggregation and general equilibrium analysis. We obtain two new equilibrium implications of job matching and search frictions for wage inequality. First, learning about match quality and worker turnover map Gaussian output noise into an ergodic wage distribution of empirically accurate shape: unimodal, skewed, with a Paretian right tail. Second, high idiosyncratic productivity risk hinders learning and sorting, and reduces wage inequality. The equilibrium solutions for the wage distribution and for the aggregate worker flows-quits to unemployment and to other jobs, displacements, hires-provide the likelihood function of the model in closed form. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.