R&DOutsourcing and the Effectiveness of Intangible Investments: Is Proprietary Core Knowledge Walking out of the Door?
基于交易成本理论和联盟关系视角，分析研发外包中客户如何通过保护措施影响供应商专用投资的有效性，发现外包给营利企业时核心知识需求越高则投资贡献越低，但外包给非营利组织时无此效应。
Abstract Intangible relationship‐specific investments can be double‐edged swords, as they facilitate not only the governance of business relationships but also undesired knowledge transfers. Building on transaction costs theory and the relational view of alliances, we analyse the effectiveness of these investments in R & D outsourcing agreements from the viewpoint of the client. We argue that, when outsourcing to business firms, the safeguards adopted by the clients to prevent spillovers may reduce the effectiveness of the supplier's specialized investments. Using original survey data from 170 E uropean and US technology‐intensive firms, we find that the contribution of these investments to client performance decreases the more a client's core knowledge is required to perform the service, except when outsourcing to non‐profits. This suggests that as the appropriability hazards associated with outsourcing to business firms rise, the client is able to capture less value from the supplier's relationship‐specific investments.