On the Efficiency of Codeshare Contracts between Airlines: Is Double Marginalization Eliminated?
用结构计量模型检验代码共享协议能否消除航空公司之间的双重边际化，发现当运营航司在相关市场同时提供竞争性直飞产品时，上下游加价仍然存在，且有效定价能降低价格并显著提升消费者福利。
Previous research has suggested that codeshare agreements eliminate double marginalization that exists when unaffiliated airlines independently determine the price for different segments of an interline trip. Using a structural econometric model, this paper investigates whether codeshare contracts do eliminate double marginalization. The results suggest that both upstream and downstream margins persist when the operating carrier of a codeshare product also offers competing single-carrier product(s) in the concerned market. Furthermore, counterfactual simulations from the model suggest that efficient pricing of these codeshare products would lower their price, and yield nontrivial increases in consumer welfare.