Centralization, Fiscal Federalism, and Private School Attendance*
用可计算一般均衡模型分析公立学校融资对私立学校入学率的影响，发现集权化不一定导致私立学校入学率上升，甚至可能使其下降，质疑了集权化降低公立学校质量的推测。
A CGE model is used to analyze the impact of public school financing on private school attendance. The common perception that public school finance centralization will necessarily lead to greater private school attendance is not correct in such a model—even when that centralization involves an extreme equalization as in California. Furthermore, if centralization is less dramatic (as in most states), declines in private school attendance are even more pronounced. This weakens the speculation that low exit rates to private schools in centralizing states imply that general public school quality does not drop as a result of such centralization.