Plans, Prices, and Corruption: The Soviet Firm Under Partial Centralization, 1930 to 1990
基于苏联指挥体系的新历史研究，分析了计划制定者与努力制定者之间的互动如何影响实际产出、隐性通胀和腐败质量，解释了苏联高腐败下仍快速增长及1970年代增长放缓伴随租金私有化的原因。
On the basis of new historical research on the Soviet command system we analyze the choices of a plan-setter and an effort-setter who interacted with each other and an external market to determine real output, hidden inflation, and the quality of corruption. We show that the performance of the Soviet economy was affected not only by the level of corruption but also by its quality, that is, how corrupt incomes were used. Our results explain rapid Soviet economic growth despite high corruption levels, and why slower economic growth in the 1970s was accompanied by increased privatization of rents.