PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF PRE‐TRIAL BARGAINING*
研究了鼓励私人提起反垄断诉讼的效果，通过构建信息不对称下的诉讼与和解模型，发现法院需限制证据规则以区分应诉与不应诉的被告，并证明提高损害赔偿比降低诉讼启动成本更有效，同时引入败诉原告赔偿被告的制度能带来巨大收益。
We study the effect of encouraging private actions for breaches of competition law. We develop a model of litigation and settlement with asymmetric information. We show that screening liable from non‐liable defendants requires the Court to restrict the rules governing admissible evidence. We study how to design the rules so as to enhance the role of private litigation in antitrust enforcement and prove that increasing damages is better than reducing costs of initiating suits. We also find large benefits from introducing a system of compensation for defendants found non‐liable, paid by unsuccessful plaintiffs.