Efficiency of Simultaneous Search
构建了一个劳动力搜寻模型，工人可同时向多家企业申请工作以增加搜寻强度，并观察工资报价后选择申请对象。研究发现，当申请成本趋近于零时，均衡结果收敛于有效的瓦尔拉斯均衡；即使申请成本不可忽略，企业进入、搜寻强度和职位空缺数量也是约束有效的，而工资离散对约束有效性至关重要。
This paper presents an equilibrium labor search model in which workers can simultaneously apply to multiple firms to increase their search intensity. They observe firms' wage postings before choosing where to apply. Owing to coordination frictions, a firm may not receive any applications; otherwise it is able to hire unless all its applicants have better offers. It is shown that the equilibrium converges to the efficient Walrasian outcome as application costs vanish. Even for nonnegligible application costs, the entry of firms, the search intensity, and the number of filled vacancies are constrained efficient. Wage dispersion is essential for constrained efficiency. (c) 2009 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.