Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information
研究在不对称信息（逆向选择和道德风险）下，交易标准化非排他金融合约的经济体中竞争均衡的存在性问题，发现价格非线性（买卖价差）和合约回报可完全对冲是均衡存在的关键条件。
This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies where agents trade in markets for standardized, non-exclusive financial contracts, under conditions of asymmetric information (both of the moral hazard and the adverse selection type). The problems for the existence of competitive equilibria in this framework are identified, and shown to be essentially the same under different forms of asymmetric information. We then show that a “minimal” form of non-linearity of prices (a bid-ask spread, requiring only the possibility to separate buyers and sellers), and the condition that the aggregate return on the individual positions in each contract can be perfectly hedged in the existing markets, ensure the existence of competitive equilibria in the case of both adverse selection and moral hazard. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D50, D82.