On the Design of Contingent Capital with a Market Trigger
研究了市场触发型或有资本（CC）的设计问题，发现直接利益相关者无法选择最优转换政策时，除非转换时价值转移不被预期，否则不存在唯一竞争均衡，这可能导致价格不确定性和市场操纵等问题。
ABSTRACT Contingent capital (CC), which aims to internalize the costs of too‐big‐to‐fail in the capital structure of large banks, has been under intense debate by policy makers and academics. We show that CC with a market trigger, in which direct stakeholders are unable to choose optimal conversion policies, does not lead to a unique competitive equilibrium unless value transfer at conversion is not expected ex ante. The “no value transfer” restriction precludes penalizing bank managers for taking excessive risk. Multiplicity or absence of equilibrium introduces the potential for price uncertainty, market manipulation, inefficient capital allocation, and frequent conversion errors.