Market Transparency and Market Structure: The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999
从理论上分析1999年《牲畜强制报告法案》如何通过强制包装商共享信息来影响畜牧业的竞争行为和市场结构，指出该法案的实际作用可能并非支持者所声称的为饲养者提供信息价值。
The premise of the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 is that enhanced transparency promotes competition. This article provides a theoretical study of the consequences of such transparency for the structure, conduct, and performance of the livestock industry. I conclude that the usefulness of the Act to the livestock industry may not be in the value of reported information to feeders, as the supporters of the Act claim. Rather, by forcing packers to pool information at negligible marginal cost, the Act may foster more competitive conduct in the procurement of livestock.