A Political Model of Monetary Policy with Application to the Real Fed Funds Rate
将美联储视为普通联邦官僚机构，构建实证模型分析1961-1996年间行政、立法和官僚对真实联邦基金利率的影响，发现总统党派和参议院银行委员会领导层的投票分数分别代表行政和立法影响。
We construct an empirical model of U.S. monetary policy assuming that the Federal Reserve is an ordinary federal bureaucracy. We use the real Federal Funds rate as our policy measure and show the existence of significant executive, legislative, and bureaucratic influence on the real rate of interest from 1961 to 1996. We find that presidential party is an adequate statistical measure of executive influence and that the voting scores of the Senate Banking Committee leadership best represent legislative influence. We argue that political changes cause systematic and predictable changes in monetary policy.