First Versus Second Mover Advantage with Information Asymmetry about the Profitability of New Markets
研究了当一方对新市场盈利信息略占优势时，先动可能带来优势；但信息优势过大反而导致后动优势，且更准确的信息可能因延迟动机而降低效率。
Is it better to move first, or second—to innovate, or to imitate? We show that if one player's information about the profitability of new markets is only modestly superior, the possibility of foreclosing the market can lead to a first‐mover advantage. On the other hand, more extreme information superiority can reverse this, leading to a second‐mover advantage. Knowing more surely what is the best choice, the better‐informed player wants to delay to keep his information private and the less‐informed player wants to delay to learn. Because of this, more accurate information can actually lead to inefficiency by increasing the incentive to delay, and exogenous costs of delay can aid efficiency by neutralizing that strategic incentive. In fact, in some circumstances a player may purposely coarsen his information to deter imitation.