Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises
实证研究市场纪律与存款保险的相互作用，以及银行危机对市场纪律的影响，基于阿根廷、智利和墨西哥1980-1990年代的数据，发现存款人通过提取存款和要求更高利率来约束银行，存款保险未削弱市场纪律，危机后投资者对银行风险的敏感度增加。
This paper empirically investigates two issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline. We evaluate the interaction between market discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market discipline. We focus on the experiences of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s. We find that depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates. Deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of market discipline. Aggregate shocks affect deposits and interest rates during crises, regardless of bank fundamentals, and investors' responsiveness to bank risk taking increases in the aftermath of crises.