Redistributive Taxation in the Roy Model*
研究了个人根据多维技能选择不同部门时，政府如何设计最优非线性所得税，发现部门互补性下最优税制比标准单部门模型累进性更低，但比无职业选择的离散类型多部门模型更高。
Abstract We consider optimal redistribution in a model where individuals can self-select into one of several possible sectors based on heterogeneity in a multidimensional skill vector. We first show that when the government does not observe the sectoral choice or underlying skills of its citizens, the constrained Pareto frontier can be implemented with a single nonlinear income tax. We then characterize this optimal tax schedule. If sectoral inputs are complements, a many-sector model with self-selection leads to optimal income taxes that are less progressive than the corresponding taxes in a standard single-sector model under natural conditions. However, they are more progressive than in canonical multisector economies with discrete types and without occupational choice or overlapping sectoral wage distributions.