Information Overload in a Network of Targeted Communication
探讨定向通信网络中信息过载的含义与成因，分析通过通信附加费和拍卖等机制分配接收者注意力的效果，发现提高通信成本在多数情况下对接收者有利，对发送者则取决于成本分配方式或信息准确度。
As the costs of generating and transmitting information fall, the main bottlenecks in communication networks are becoming the human receivers, who are overloaded with information. For networks of targeted communication, this paper discusses the meaning of information overload, provides a theoretical treatment of its causes, and examines mechanisms for allocating the attention of receivers. Mechanisms for allocating atten-tion include surcharges on communication and auctions. These mechanisms increase the cost of sending messages and shift the task of screening messages from the receivers to the senders. This shift may benefit both the receivers and the senders because the senders know the contents of the messages whereas the receivers do not. We show that, if the communication cost is low, then an increase in the communication cost benefits most (but not all) receivers. The increase benefits all the senders if either the extra cost is a tax that is redistributed to them as lump-sum transfers or the senders’ information about the receivers is sufficiently accurate. Author’s address: