Equilibrium and Inefficiency in a Community Model With Peer Group Effects
研究社区中公共服务产出受同伴群体效应影响时，通过投票决定公共支出、居民可迁移且地价存在差异的模型，发现社区可能变得异质且出现次优低效率，原因是迁移产生的外部性，而地价差异仅起转移支付作用。
Public-service output depends on input expenditures, on own personal characteristics, and on the characteristics of the other residents in the community (the peer group effect). In a community model with public expenditures set by voting, with migration between communities, and with land price differentials (capitalization), it is shown that communities may become heterogeneous in composition and (second-best) inefficient. This equilibrium occurs when the peer group effect is neither "too strong" nor "too weak." The inefficiency arises because an externality is created by migration. The land price differential does not play the part of the "price" of the better peer group, but of a transfer payment. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.