Does Poor Performance Damage the Reputation of Financial Intermediaries? Evidence from the Loan Syndication Market
研究了牵头安排行的借款人大量破产对其后续银团贷款活动的影响，发现声誉受损导致其保留更大贷款份额、更少发放贷款且更难吸引参与行，但主导安排行受影响较小。
ABSTRACT We investigate the effect of poor performance on financial intermediary reputation by estimating the effect of large‐scale bankruptcies among a lead arranger's borrowers on its subsequent syndication activity. Consistent with reputation damage, such lead arrangers retain larger fractions of the loans they syndicate, are less likely to syndicate loans, and are less likely to attract participant lenders. The consequences are more severe when borrower bankruptcies suggest inadequate screening or monitoring by the lead arranger. However, the effect of borrower bankruptcies on syndication activity is not present among dominant lead arrangers, and is weak in years in which many lead arrangers experience borrower bankruptcies.