Vertical Restraints in a Model of Vertical Differentiation
研究制造商向零售商销售同质商品时，零售商在价格和售后服务上竞争。发现最优线性价格合同对纵向结构无效率，而转售价格维持和特许费等简单纵向约束虽优于线性合同，但无法恢复纵向效率，最后描述了有效率的合同。
We consider the case of a manufacturer who sells a homogeneous good to retailers who compete in prices and "cum-sales" or "post-sales" services. We show that the optimal linear-price contract is inefficient from the point of view of the vertical structure and that simple forms of vertical restraints, such as resale price maintenance and franchise fees, dominate the optimal linear-price contract, but do not restore vertical efficiency. Our analysis is concluded with the description of an efficient contract.