Risk Selection under Public Health Insurance with Opt‐Out
研究在部分人可退出强制公共保险时，公共与私人保险间的风险选择。理论模型显示对称信息下公共保险被逆向选择，私有信息下可能有利或不利选择；德国数据发现公共保险总体被逆向选择，但个体基于风险厌恶和居住地有利选择公共保险。
This paper studies risk selection between public and private health insurance when some, but not all, individuals can opt out of otherwise mandatory public insurance. Using a theoretical model, I show that public insurance is adversely selected when insurers and insureds are symmetrically informed about health-related risks, and that there can be adverse or advantageous selection when insureds are privately informed. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, I find that (i) public insurance is, on balance, adversely selected under the German public health insurance with opt out scheme, (ii) individuals advantageously select public insurance based on risk aversion and residential location, and (iii) there is suggestive evidence of asymmetric information in the market for private health insurance. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.