The Cyclical Behavior of Strategic Inventories
建立模型说明双寡头企业利用库存来维持默契合谋，高需求时增加库存可抑制作弊，解释了库存与销售的正相关关系，并实证发现该关系在集中行业更显著。
This paper presents a model in which inventories are used by a duopoly to deter deviations from an implicitly collusive arrangement. Higher inventories allow firms to punish cheaters more strongly and can thus help to maintain collusion. We show that when demand is high, the incentive to deviate increases so that increases in inventories may be optimal for the duopoly. This rationalizes the observed positive correlation between inventories and sales. In our empirical section we show that, as our model predicts, this correlation is more important in concentrated industries. We also provide several examples where inventories have been a factor in cartel behavior.