Training and Union Wages
研究工会通过设定最低工资导致工资压缩是否增加在职培训，利用德国企业面板数据和行政员工数据检验假设，发现工会认可通过最低工资和工资压缩提高了学徒培训强度。
This paper investigates whether unions, through imposing wage floors that lead to wage compression, increase on-the-job training. Our analysis focuses on Germany. Based on a model of unions and firm-financed training, we derive empirical implications regarding apprenticeship training intensity, layoffs, wage cuts, and wage compression in unionized and nonunionized firms. We test these implications using firm panel data matched with administrative employee data. We find support for the hypothesis that union recognition, via imposing minimum wages and wage compression, increases training in apprenticeship programs. Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.