Partnership dissolution with interdependent values
研究估值相互依赖且仅一方知情时合伙解散的效率问题，发现与私有估值情形不同，完全效率难以实现，初始所有权分配影响最优补贴和次优福利。
We study partnership dissolution when valuations are interdependent and only one party is informed. In contrast with the case of private values (Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer, 1987), in which efficient trade is feasible whenever initial shares are about equal, there exists a wide class of situations in which full efficiency cannot be reached. In these cases, (i) the subsidy required to restore the first best is minimal when the entire ownership is allocated initially to one of the parties, and (ii) ruling out external subsidies, the second‐best welfare is maximized when one of the parties initially has full ownership .