The WTO Impact on International Trade Disputes: An Event History Analysis
通过事件史分析GATT、WTO和美国301条款案例，检验WTO是否增加了美国贸易争端的发生频率并缩短了其持续时间。
Many consider improved dispute settlement one of the leading achievements of the WTO. This paper tests the implication of a game-theoretic approach that predicts that more efficient litigation devices increase the frequency and number of trade disputes. We propose an empirical event history analysis of GATT, WTO, and USTR Section 301 cases, identify the demographic patterns for births and lifespans of U.S. disputes, and test the hypothesis of a WTO structural break. The evidence supports the view that the WTO increased the incidence of U.S. trade disputes, while shortening their lifespan. Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.