Barriers to Investment in Polarized Societies
构建了一个动态政治经济学模型，研究公共支出构成的分歧如何导致短视政策，过度税收降低资本回报和投资率，长期使产出、消费和福利低于有效水平，极化程度越大效率损失越大，政治稳定可缓解极化影响。
I present a tractable dynamic model of political economy where disagreements about the composition of public spending result in implementation of short-sighted policies. Excessive taxation reduces the return to physical capital and hence investment rates, which slows down growth along the transition. In the long run, output, consumption and welfare are inefficiently low. The larger is the degree of polarization, the greater is the inefficiency. Political stability mitigates the effects of polarization by making the incumbent internalize the dynamic inefficiencies introduced by the choice of growth-retarding policies.