The Importance of Ordering in Sequential Auctions
研究在顺序拍卖中，拍卖品的排序如何影响拍卖效率，针对一个买家通过两轮第二价格拍卖外包两个不同任务、面对有产能限制的供应商的场景。
To date, the largest part of literature on multi-unit auctions has assumed that there are k homogeneous objects being auctioned, where each bidder wishes to win exactly one or all of k units. These modeling assumptions have made the examination of ordering in sequential auctions inconsequential. The aim of this paper is to introduce and highlight the critical influence that ordering can have on the efficiency of an auction. We study a buyer who outsources via sequential 2nd-price auctions two heterogeneous jobs, and faces a diverse set of suppliers with capacity constraints.