Happy Doctor Makes Happy Baby? Incentivizing Physicians Improves Quality of Prenatal Care
利用丹麦政策变化，研究医生支付方式（按人头付费与按服务收费）对婴儿健康的影响，发现按人头付费下医生护理的初生婴儿健康更差，尤其对年轻母亲的初生儿影响显著。
Physician-induced demand, whereby physicians alter patient treatment for personal gain, lies at the heart of concerns about publicly provided health care. However, little is known about how payment systems affect the ultimate outcome of patient health. Exploiting a unique policy induced variation in Denmark, I investigate the impact of physician payment contracts on infant health. In a difference-in-differences framework, I find that firstborn infants exposed in the womb to the care of general practitioners with capitation contracts have poorer infant health outcomes than infants exposed to fee-for-service contracts. The firstborn children of younger women primarily drive the effects.