Managerial Ownership and Corporate Hedging
基于443家英国非金融公司数据，发现管理层风险规避会使其偏离最优对冲头寸，而股东与管理层的利益冲突虽影响风险决策，却非对冲决策的主因，后者更多与提升企业预期价值的因素相关。
Abstract: Using information on 443 UK non‐financial companies, this work provides evidence supporting the hypothesis that managerial risk aversion is an incentive to deviate from the optimal hedging position. Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers are at the centre of the decision about the firm's risk profile but are not relevant as determinants of the decision to hedge. This is rather associated with factors enhancing the firm's expected value (underinvestment, scale economies, tax savings).