Product Market Imperfections and Loan Commitments
通过竞争性银行模型证明，借款人所在行业的产品市场不完善会影响贷款合同特征；即使没有风险分担和信息不对称，贷款承诺也能提升不完全竞争行业中企业的价值，但所有企业整体却因贷款承诺而境况变差。
ABSTRACT I show in a model of competitive banks that the characteristics of loan contracts are affected by product market imperfections in the borrower's industry. A bank loan commitment increases the value of a borrower firm operating in an imperfectly competitive industry and thus dominates a simple loan even in the absence of risk sharing considerations and informational asymmetries between the borrower and the bank. While it is individually rational for a firm to obtain a loan commitment, all the firms in that industry taken together are made worse off by the existence of loan commitments.