MONEY TALKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CHEAP TALK AND BURNED MONEY
通过实验研究在信息传递中同时使用廉价谈话和金钱时的策略选择，发现发送者偏好免费信息，仅当利益冲突加剧时才会烧钱增强可信度。
We experimentally study the strategic transmission of information in a setting where both cheap talk and money can be used. Theoretically, many equilibria exist side by side, in which senders use either costless messages, money, or both. We find that senders prefer to communicate through costless messages. Only when the interest disalignment between sender and receiver increases does cheap talk tend to break down and high sender types start burning money to enhance the credibility of their costless messages. A behavioral model assuming that sellers bear a cost of lying fits the data best.