Traceability, Liability, and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality
通过模型分析发现，增强食品可追溯性通过提高责任成本，激励农场和营销企业提供更安全的食品，并指出不完善的可追溯性会削弱这种激励。
Abstract Recent food scares such as the discoveries of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and E. coli ‐contaminated spinach have heightened interest in food traceability. Here, we show how exogenous increases in food traceability create incentives for farms and marketing firms to supply safer food by increasing liability costs. We model a stylized marketing chain composed of farms, marketers, and consumers. Unsafe food for consumers can be caused by either marketers or farms. We show that food safety declines with the number of farms and marketers and imperfect traceability from consumers to marketers dampens liability incentives to supply safer food by farms.