Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs
研究当政府无法观察个人在市场和家务中的时间价值时，如何最优设定税收和转移支付，发现最优方案是对高工资者征税、对低工资者补贴，且不工作的人无转移收入。
This paper explores how to optimally set taxes and transfers when taxation authorities are uninformed about individuals' value of time in both market and nonmarket activities; and can observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment. We show that optimal redistribution in this environment involves a cutoff wage whereby workers above the cutoff are taxed as they increase their income, while workers earning a wage below the cutoff receive an income supplement as they increase their income. Finally, we show that the optimal program transfers zero income to individuals who choose not to work.