Contracts, Biases, and Consumption of Access Services
研究了合同结构（按次付费与三部分定价）如何影响接入服务的消费，发现消费者会过快使用免费单位导致过度消费和福利损失，且近半数人愿意为免费接入支付全价，最优企业策略是提供小幅折扣的三部分定价，可增加8%-14%的收入。
We study theoretically and empirically the consumption of access services. We demonstrate that consumption is affected by contract structure (pay-per-use versus three-part tariffs) even if the optimal consumption plans are identical. We find that, although there is extensive individual heterogeneity, on average, consumers' choices follow a structure that is similar to a nearly optimal heuristic and correctly react to imbalances between the number of free calls and call opportunities remaining. However, consumers use the free units too quickly, leading to overconsumption and lost surplus. These errors are partially driven by mistaken beliefs about the value distribution. We also measure subjects' willingness to pay for a contract with free access units, and we find that nearly half of subjects are willing to pay at least the full per-unit price, with a substantial fraction willing to overpay. In response, the optimal firm strategy offers a three-part tariff at a very small discount, which increases revenue by 8%–14% compared to only offering a pay-per-use contract. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1889 . This paper was accepted by Teck-Hua Ho, behavioral economics.