Dismissals for Cause: The Difference That Just Eight Paragraphs Can Make
利用葡萄牙一项法律改革作为准实验，发现因故解雇的繁琐程序仅适用于大企业，小企业因此获得灵活性，其相对绩效显著提升，暗示降低此类解雇成本能激励员工努力。
This article presents evidence about the effects of dismissals-for-cause requirements, a specific component of employment protection legislation that has received little attention. I study a quasi-experiment generated by a law introduced in Portugal: out of the 12 paragraphs in the law that dictated the costly procedure required for dismissals for cause, eight did not apply to small firms. Using matched employer-employee longitudinal data and difference-in-differences methods, I examine the impact of that differentiated change in firing costs upon several variables. The results do not indicate robust effects on job or worker flows, although some estimates suggest an increase in hirings. However, firms that gain flexibility in their dismissals exhibit sizable increases in their relative performance. This finding suggests that reducing firing costs of the type studied here increases workers' effort. (c) 2009 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.