Understanding Bank-Run Contagion
通过实验协调游戏，研究恐慌性存款挤兑如何从一家银行传染到另一家银行，发现挤兑通过影响储户对其他储户行为的信念而传染，且只有当挤兑提供关于银行基本面的信息信号时才具有传染性。
We study experimental coordination games to examine through which transmission channels and under which information conditions a panic-based depositor run at one bank may trigger a panic-based depositor run at another bank. We find that withdrawals at one bank trigger withdrawals at another bank by increasing players’ beliefs that other depositors in their own bank will withdraw, making them more likely to withdraw as well. Observed withdrawals only affect depositors’ beliefs, and are thus contagious when they form an informative signal about bank fundamentals. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2416 . This paper was accepted by Amit Seru, finance.