The Structure of Decision Rights in Franchising Networks: A Property Rights Perspective
运用产权理论解释特许经营网络中决策权的分配，发现加盟商的决策权比例与当地市场资产的可契约性正相关，与系统特定资产的可契约性负相关，且创新资产比运营资产对决策权分配影响更大。基于德国特许经营商数据的检验支持了这些假设。
This paper explains the structure of decision rights in franchising networks using property rights theory. Property rights theory explains the allocation of decision rights based on the importance of intangible assets. We submit that franchisees’ fraction of decision rights varies positively with the contractibility of local market assets and negatively with contractibility of system–specific assets. Further, franchisees’ less contractible innovation assets impact decision rights allocations more than contractible operation assets. Hypotheses tested on data from German franchisors are largely supportive. We extend the franchise literature by arguing that the contractibility of local market assets impacts the allocation of decision rights, and that decision rights allocations change for decisions involving different areas of the value chain.