Principal‐Agent Problems in S&L Salvage
分析新立法和传统FDIC破产处理程序如何加剧了导致FSLIC危机的委托代理问题，并解释这些约束如何拖慢破产处理、增加融资成本、降低RTC的资产回收价值。
ABSTRACT New legislation and traditional FDIC insolvency‐resolution procedures transform and intensify the principal‐agent problems most responsible for the FSLIC mess. These problems explain counterproductive constraints on the governance and operating policies of the agency responsible for rescuing and salvaging assets in insolvent thrifts: the RTC. The constraints slow insolvency resolution, increase interim financing costs, and undermine RTC recovery of asset value. Operationalizing its task as preserving evanescent and economically misconceived “franchise values,” the RTC allows insolvents to seek financing on an unconsolidated basis, initiates bidding for one institution at a time, holds back seriously troubled assets, and recruits an overly narrow range of bidders.