INVESTMENT CYCLES, STRATEGIC DELAY, AND SELF-REVERSING CASCADES*
研究了一个社会学习模型中的投资周期，其中投资回报根据马尔可夫过程波动，代理人可以选择立即投资或延迟决策，发现延迟机会缩短了投资级联、延长了衰退、缩短了繁荣，并减少了过度投资。
We study investment cycles in a social learning model, where investment returns fluctuate according to a Markov process. In our Waiting Game, agents observe the investment history and a private signal correlated with the current period's investment return. Agents then decide whether to invest immediately or to delay their decision to later in the period. Cascades in which everyone invests or no one invests eventually reverse themselves. As compared to the No-Waiting Game with no opportunity for delay, the Waiting Game has shorter investment cascades, longer recessions, shorter booms, more underinvestment, and less overinvestment.