Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists
推导了内部投资者（如风险投资家）在解决多阶段金融契约中的代理问题的作用，发现固定份额契约能实现最优投资决策并消除错误定价动机。
ABSTRACT We derive a role for inside investors, such as venture capitalists, in resolving various agency problems that arise in a multistage financial contracting problem. Absent an inside investor, the choice of securities is unlikely to reveal all private information, and overinvestment may occur. An inside investor, however, always makes optimal investment decisions if and only if he holds a fixed‐fraction contract, where he always receives a fixed fraction of the project's payoff and finances that same fraction of future investments. This contract also eliminates any incentives of the venture capitalist to misprice securities issued in later financing rounds.