Corporate Control and the Choice of Investment Financing: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions
检验公司控制权考虑如何影响投资融资方式（现金/债务或股票），发现收购方管理层持股比例越高，越倾向用现金融资，且股票融资的负面异常回报主要发生在管理层持股低的公司。
ABSTRACT We test the proposition that corporate control considerations motivate the means of investment financing—cash (and debt) or stock. Corporate insiders who value control will prefer financing investments by cash or debt rather than by issuing new stock which dilutes their holdings and increases the risk of losing control. Our empirical results support this hypothesis: in corporate acquisitions, the larger the managerial ownership fraction of the acquiring firm the more likely the use of cash financing. Also, the previously observed negative bidders' abnormal returns associated with stock financing are mainly in acquisitions made by firms with low managerial ownership.