Time Consistency and Bureaucratic Budget Competition
研究公共部门高就业保护如何导致部门间策略性过度雇佣，官僚为获取未来配套投入而多雇人，并基于调查证实决策者意识到此策略效应。
High employment protection in the public sector results in strategic over-employment if government divisions compete for budgets in a dynamic setting. Bureaucrats who are interested in maximising their divisions' output employ excess labour, since this induces the sponsor to provide complementary inputs in the future. Restrictions on hiring decisions in the public sector can be regarded as provisions to reduce strategic hiring. We also provide evidence from a survey of decision makers in a public sector bureaucracy with very high employment protection. The results confirm that decision makers are aware of the strategic effects of their hiring decisions on budget allocation. Copyright 2008 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2008.